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SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 1 v. REDDING: 
BALANCING STUDENTS’ RIGHTS 
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT’S 
INTEREST IN PROTECTING THE 
EDUCATIONAL PROCESS 
CHRIS SUEDEKUM* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that Safford school 
officials violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Savana Redding, a 
thirteen-year-old middle school student, by strip-searching her in an 
effort to locate prescription drugs.1 The Ninth Circuit further held, 
dividing 6-5, that Assistant Principal Kerry Wilson, who ordered the 
search, was not entitled to qualified immunity in light of the 
constitutional principles the court found were “clearly established” at 
the time of the event.2  
On January 16, 2009, the Supreme Court granted Safford School 
District’s petition for a writ of certiorari.3 Safford has raised two 
issues: first, whether the Fourth Amendment permits school officials 
to search a student suspected of possessing and distributing 
prescription drugs on campus in violation of school policy; and 
second, if the search does not pass constitutional muster, whether the 
officials were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
  * 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 2. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1089. 
 3. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 987 (mem.) (U.S. Jan 16, 2009) (No. 08-
479). 
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II.  FACTS 
A student at Safford Middle School approached Assistant 
Principal Kerry Wilson on the morning of October 8, 2003, and 
handed him a small white pill.4 The student, Jordan Romero, informed 
Wilson that a classmate, Marissa Glines, had given him the pill and 
that a group of students was planning to take the pills at lunchtime.5 
Wilson took the pill to the school nurse, who identified it as a 400 mg 
ibuprofen, obtainable only by prescription.6 A student’s possession of 
these pills violated School Rule J-3050, which prohibits students from 
bringing any prescription or over-the-counter drug onto campus 
without the school’s permission.7 
Wilson went to Marissa’s classroom and asked her to gather her 
possessions and accompany him to his office.8 Wilson noticed a black 
planner located in the desk next to Marissa and asked the classroom 
teacher to determine the owner.9 Opening the planner, the teacher 
found several knives, cigarette lighters, and a cigarette, but Marissa 
denied having any knowledge of the planner or its contents.10 Wilson 
escorted Marissa to his office, where he instructed Marissa to turn out 
her pockets and open her wallet.11 This search revealed several white 
pills identical to the one Jordan had possessed and a blue pill.12 Wilson 
asked Marissa where the blue pill13 came from, and she responded, “I 
guess it slipped in when she gave me the IBU 400s.”14 Wilson asked, 
“Who is she?” Marissa responded “Savana Redding.”15 
Wilson asked a female assistant to take Marissa to the nurse’s 
office for a more intensive search while Wilson located Savana 
Redding.16 Wilson found Redding in class and asked her to gather her 
 
 4. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1076. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Brief for Petitioners at 2–4, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, No. 08-479 
(U.S. Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief] (noting that students are required to leave 
medicine in the school office). 
 8. Id. at 6. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 7. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. (“later discovered to be Naprosyn 200 mg”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 7–8. 
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belongings and accompany him to his office.17 He then confronted her 
with the planner, its contents, and the pills from Jordan and Marissa.18 
Redding admitted that the planner was hers and that she had loaned 
it to Marissa a few days earlier but told Wilson that the knives, 
lighters, and cigarette were not hers.19 She also denied distributing any 
pills to her classmates and claimed that she had never seen the pills.20 
Redding consented to a search of her backpack, but Wilson did 
not find any pills.21 Wilson then asked Romero, a female assistant, to 
take Redding to the nurse’s office where she and Nurse Schwallier 
privately conducted a more thorough search of Redding.22 The two 
women asked Redding to remove her socks and shoes so they could 
check for hidden pills.23 Romero next asked Redding to remove her 
shirt and pants, and then instructed her to shake out her bra and 
underwear to ensure that Redding was not hiding any pills.24 
Confirming that Redding did not have any pills, Romero immediately 
returned the clothes to Redding.25 April Redding soon after filed suit 
on behalf of her daughter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that 
the school officials had violated Savana Redding’s Fourth 
Amendment rights by conducting this search.26 
This incident was not the first time that Wilson or other Safford 
school officials were confronted with drug use at Safford Middle 
School. In 2002, a student brought prescription pills onto campus and 
distributed them to classmates, which nearly resulted in the death of a 
student.27 The student suffered an adverse reaction and had to be 
airlifted to a hospital, where he spent several days in intensive care.28 
Even more recently—a week before the incident in this case—
Assistant Principal Wilson had met with Jordan and his mother and 
 
 17. Id. at 8. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 8. 
 22. Id. at 10. 
 23. Id. at 11. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 4–5. 
 28. Id. at 5. 
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learned that a classmate had given Jordan a pill that caused him to 
become violent and sick to his stomach.29 
The incident was also not the first time officials suspected Savana 
Redding of violating school rule J-3050. At a school dance that 
opened the 2003-2004 school year, members of the school staff 
detected the smell of alcohol around a small group of students—
including both Redding and Marissa—and later that evening 
discovered a bottle of liquor in the girls’ bathroom.30 The meeting with 
Jordan and his mother further supported the staff’s suspicion when 
Jordan reported to Wilson that Redding had served students alcohol 
before the school dance.31 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court’s decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O. established 
the constitutional framework for reviewing searches of students or 
their possessions performed by public school officials.32 Although 
students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse 
gate,”33 the Supreme Court recognized that “the school setting 
requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public 
authorities are ordinarily subject.”34 The Court concluded that the 
warrant requirement, in particular, was “unsuited to the school 
environment.”35 Instead, the Court sought to create a flexible standard 
that would “preserv[e] the informality of the student-teacher 
relationship.”36 The Court determined that “special needs”37 inherent 
in the public school context justified adopting a standard by which the 
legality of a search would depend on the “reasonableness, under all 
the circumstances, of the search.”38  
T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard sought to strike a balance 
between students’ expectation of privacy and school officials’ equally 
 
 29. Id. at 5–6. 
 30. Id. at 5. 
 31. Id. at 6. 
 32. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985). 
 33. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 34. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 339–40. 
 37. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (discussing the T.L.O. 
standard). 
 38. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. 
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legitimate need to maintain a safe and orderly learning environment.39 
The standard “spare[s] teachers and school administrators the 
necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause”40 
and permits educators to focus their attention on “teaching and 
helping students, rather than on developing evidence against a 
particular troublemaker.”41 At the same time, the reasonableness 
standard ensures “that the interests of students will be invaded no 
more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving 
order in the schools.”42 
The Fourth Amendment43 does not require the “least intrusive” 
search practicable in order to be reasonable.44 Instead, courts evaluate 
the reasonableness of a school search by utilizing the two-prong test 
described in T.L.O.: first, whether the search was “justified at 
inception”; and second, whether the scope of the search was 
reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the interference in 
the first place.45 Ordinarily, a search is justified at inception “when 
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn 
up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law 
or the rules of the school.”46 Furthermore, a search is permissible in 
scope “when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the 
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the 
age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”47 In 
assessing the scope of a search, judges may consider the nature of the 
infraction. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that a school 
rule prohibiting certain conduct reflects a judgment by administrators 
that the conduct is destructive of a proper educational environment 
and courts should defer to those judgments, rather than attempting to 
determine which rules are “important.”48 
 
 39. Id. at 340. 
 40. Id. at 343. 
 41. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 42. Id. at 342 (majority opinion). 
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 44. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995). 
 45. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). 
 46. Id. at 341–42. 
 47. Id. at 342. 
 48. Id. at 342 n.9 (rejecting the argument that some rules regarding student conduct are too 
“trivial” to justify searches based upon reasonable suspicion). 
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T.L.O. is the only case in which the Supreme Court reviewed a 
school search based on individualized suspicion and applied the two-
prong reasonableness test. In it, a school official searched T.L.O.’s 
purse after a teacher reported that T.L.O. was smoking in the 
bathroom.49 The Court held the search was justified at inception 
because the purse was an obvious place to look for the cigarettes.50 
Satisfying T.L.O.’s “justified at inception” prong requires officials to 
possess reasonable grounds for suspecting that a search will turn up 
evidence that the student has violated or is violating school rules.51 At 
least one lower court’s application of this prong has held that a tip 
from a student informant gave school officials reasonable grounds to 
search another student for drugs.52 
If a search is justified at inception, a court must then determine 
whether the scope of the search actually conducted was “reasonably 
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in 
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the 
infraction.”53 In this prong of the reasonableness test, a court must 
balance the student’s legitimate expectations of privacy against the 
school’s interest in preserving order. In T.L.O., the Supreme Court 
acknowledged, “[The] search of a child’s person . . . is undoubtedly a 
severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.”54  
In considering whether a search was excessively intrusive, the 
Sixth Circuit concluded that a search undertaken by school officials to 
find money serves a less weighty governmental interest than a search 
for items that pose a threat to the health or safety of students, such as 
drugs or weapons.55 As a result, a strip search to locate money may not 
be reasonable, but that same search might be reasonable if 
undertaken to find drugs or weapons.56 This reasoning reflects the 
 
 49. Id. at 346. 
 50. Id. at 346 (noting that it was irrelevant that other “hypotheses” were also consistent 
with the teacher’s accusation and focusing instead on whether the official had reasonable 
suspicion justifying search). 
 51. Id. at 342. 
 52. C.B. ex rel. Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 388 (11th Cir. 1996) (ruling that a 
student’s tip provided directly to administrators is a reliable source of information because of 
the possibility of disciplinary repercussions if the information is misleading). 
 53. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. 
 54. Id. at 337–38. 
 55. Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2005); Oliver v. 
McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D. Ind. 1995). 
 56. Oliver, 919 F. Supp. at 1218. 
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Supreme Court’s recognition that administrators possess a significant 
interest in protecting students from the consequences of drugs,57 
especially because “[s]chool years are the time when the physical, 
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe.”58 
Accordingly, the Court has described school administrators’ interest 
in deterring student drug use as “important—indeed, perhaps 
compelling,”59 because of the disruptive effects of drugs on the users, 
the student body, the faculty, and the educational process as a whole.60 
Several circuits have found strip searches reasonable after 
balancing students’ interests against the interests of school 
administrators. In Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consolidated High School 
District Number 230, the Seventh Circuit held that school officials’ 
strip search of a male student they suspected of “crotching” drugs was 
not excessively intrusive and therefore that the search did not violate 
the student’s rights.61 In finding the officials’ strip search reasonable, 
the court pointed to school officials’ efforts to minimize the intrusion: 
the search took place in the privacy of a locker room; the two officials 
were the same gender as the student; and the officials did not touch 
the student during the search.62 Likewise, in Williams ex rel. Williams v. 
Ellington, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a strip search by school 
officials was reasonable in light of the size of the item sought: a small 
vial containing suspected narcotics.63 In that case, another student had 
informed school officials that she saw the plaintiff with a small vial of 
white powder.64 After school officials searched the student’s locker 
and purse, “it was reasonable for [officials] to suspect the girl may be 
concealing the contraband on her person.”65 The court held that the 
strip search was not excessively intrusive—because administrators 
reasonably suspected Williams was concealing evidence of illegal 
 
 57. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002) (“The nationwide drug epidemic makes 
the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school.”). 
 58. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 662; see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007) (reaffirming that 
school officials have a strong interest in deterring drug use among students). 
 61. Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1319 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
 62. Id. at 1323. 
 63. Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 64. Id. at 882. 
 65. Id. at 887. 
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activity on her person—even though there was no information 
suggesting where Williams might be hiding the drugs.66 
But even if a plaintiff can establish a deprivation of a 
constitutional right, government officials are entitled to qualified 
immunity, which protects them from civil damages, unless their 
conduct violates a constitutional right “clearly established” at the time 
of the events in question.67 The Supreme Court has stated that a right 
is “clearly established” when the “contours of the right [are] 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that 
what he is doing violates that right.”68 Thus, the qualified immunity 
defense “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent 
or those who knowingly violate the law.”69 In obvious situations, the 
presence of earlier cases involving “fundamentally similar facts” is not 
necessary for a court to hold that a right was clearly established.70 But 
in Wilson v. Layne, the Court concluded that government officials, in 
the absence of a consensus on the constitutionality of the conduct, 
should not be subject to damages when judges disagree: “If judges 
thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject 
[officials] to money damages for picking the losing side of the 
controversy.”71 Thus, in Wilson, the Court held that government 
officials were entitled to qualified immunity because the 
constitutional question was “by no means open and shut.”72 
Many lower courts, reviewing searches under the T.L.O. standard, 
have recognized school officials’ qualified immunity because the law 
was not “clearly established” at the time of the search.73 For instance, 
the Eleventh Circuit held school officials were entitled to qualified 
immunity for a strip search of an entire fifth-grade class to find 
 
 66. Id. at 889. 
 67. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
 68. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614–15 (1999) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 
635, 640 (1987)). 
 69. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
 70. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (noting that officials can still be on notice that 
their conduct violates established law “even in novel factual circumstances”). 
 71. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617–18. 
 72. Id. at 615. 
 73. E.g., Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1991); Cornfield 
ex rel. Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993); Jenkins ex 
rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997); Beard v. Whitmore 
Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 608 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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twenty-six dollars.74 Although the court found the search 
unreasonable in scope, the court concluded that T.L.O.’s balancing 
test did not provide fair warning75 and in most instances left “school 
officials to speculate as to whether a court applying the balancing test 
to specific facts would find a search unreasonable.”76 The Sixth and 
Eleventh Circuits have repeatedly voiced concern that T.L.O. does 
not provide enough guidance to educators or judges.77 For example, in 
Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Board of Education, the Eleventh 
Circuit remarked, “[I]t is difficult to discern how T.L.O. could be 
interpreted to compel the conclusion that these defendants—or, more 
accurately, all reasonable educators standing in defendants’ place—
should have known that their conduct violated a clearly established 
constitutional right.”78 As a result, lower courts have been left “either 
reluctant or unable to define” conduct that is subject to a § 1983 cause 
of action.79 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Saucier v. Katz mandated that 
courts consider the constitutional question first, and only if a violation 
is found are courts to decide whether the right was “clearly 
established” at the time of the incident.80 Saucier reasoned that 
deciding the constitutional question before addressing qualified 
immunity benefitted both government officials and the public by 
promoting clarity in the legal standards for official conduct.81 But in 
January 2009, the Court reconsidered Saucier’s mandatory sequencing 
and held that judges were “permitted to exercise their sound 
discretion” in deciding whether to answer both questions in 
evaluating qualified immunity.82 
 
 74. Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts (Thomas II), 323 F.3d 950, 952 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 75. Id. at 956. 
 76. Id. at 954; see also Beard, 402 F.3d at 607–08 (finding mass strip search without 
individualized suspicion to find missing money unconstitutional, however, school officials were 
still entitled to qualified immunity because the law did not “truly compel” the conclusion that 
search was unreasonable). 
 77. Beard, 402 F.3d at 607; Williams, 936 F.2d at 886; Thomas II, 323 F.3d at 954; Jenkins, 
115 F.3d at 828 (finding that the law was not clearly established so as to vitiate qualified 
immunity for school officials who twice conducted strip searches of two eight-year-old second 
graders over missing seven dollars). 
 78. Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 828. 
 79. Williams, 936 F.2d at 886. 
 80. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
 81. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). 
 82. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). 
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IV.  HOLDING 
The Ninth Circuit in Redding v. Safford Unified School District 
Number 1 began by setting out the New Jersey v. T.L.O. framework 
for deciding whether the strip search of Redding met the Court’s 
reasonableness requirement.83 The Ninth Circuit followed the 
approach of the Second84 and Seventh85 Circuits to determine whether 
the search was justified at inception and concluded that as the 
intrusiveness of a search intensifies, the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to justify the search should also intensify.86 The court 
treated the searches of Redding as two separate inquiries.87 First, the 
court considered whether the search of her backpack and pockets was 
justified at inception and then moved on to consider whether the strip 
search was justified at inception.88 The court concluded that Safford 
school officials did not have a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify 
the highly intrusive strip search of Redding for hidden pills.89 
The court concluded that Marissa’s statement incriminating 
Savana Redding was self-serving and unreliable.90 Assistant Principal 
Wilson failed to fully investigate Marissa’s claim and lacked specific 
information indicating a strip search would reveal hidden pills.91 
Furthermore, because the planner that Redding had loaned to 
Marissa did not contain any pills, the planner “d[id] not make it 
significantly more likely” that Redding was responsible for the pills 
found on Marissa.92 Finally, the court noted that Redding did not have 
a disciplinary record that would contribute to forming a reasonable 
 
 83. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 84. Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 596 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 
588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding, before the T.L.O. decision, that as the intrusiveness of a search 
intensifies, the reasonableness standard approaches that of probable cause)). 
 85. Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 
1993). 
 86. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1081. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 1081–82. 
 89. Id. at 1085. 
 90. See id. at 1082–83 (noting that Marissa could have incriminated Redding in an attempt 
to deflect personal responsibility). 
 91. See id. at 1083 (noting initial search of Redding’s possessions had not revealed evidence 
linking her to the pills). 
 92. Id. at 1083–84. 
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suspicion that she possessed drugs.93 Therefore the strip search was 
not justified at inception.94 
The Ninth Circuit next addressed the scope of the search, 
weighing the nature of the infraction against the intrusiveness of the 
search.95 The court found that the nature of the infraction—the 
alleged possession of prescription strength ibuprofen—“pose[d] an 
imminent danger to no one.”96 The court also found that a strip search 
significantly intruded on a student’s legitimate privacy expectations97 
and held that a strip search was excessively intrusive in light of the 
“minimal nature” of the alleged infraction.98 The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that Safford school officials violated Redding’s 
constitutional rights by conducting a strip search that was neither 
justified at inception nor permissible in scope.99 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit considered whether Redding’s rights 
were “clearly established” at the time of the search.100 The court 
explained that some rights can be inferred from common sense and 
reason, even when no factually similar cases can be found.101 The 
Ninth Circuit held that T.L.O.’s legal framework put Safford school 
officials on notice that under these circumstances a strip search was 
not reasonable.102 The Ninth Circuit held that Redding’s rights were 
clearly established and therefore Assistant Principal Wilson was not 
entitled to qualified immunity.103 
 V.  ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit applied New Jersey v. T.L.O.’s two-prong 
reasonableness test in a flawed manner because it mistakenly 
considered the intrusiveness of the search in determining whether the 
 
 93. Id. at 1084. 
 94. Id. at 1085. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1085–86 (discussing the psychological trauma caused by a strip search). 
 98. Id. at 1087 (concluding that school officials had neutralized any danger the pills posed). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. at 1087 (explaining “common sense and reason supplement the federal 
reporters,” and therefore it is not necessary to find a case “on all fours”). 
 102. Id. at 1088. 
 103. Id. at 1089. 
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search was “justified at inception.”104 The Ninth Circuit followed the 
approach adopted by the Second and Seventh Circuits, both of which 
found that the level of suspicion needed to justify a search increases 
with its intrusiveness.105 But the legal justification for this approach is 
flawed. The Seventh Circuit did not cite any legal authority, not even 
T.L.O., for its sliding scale approach, while the Second Circuit relied 
on a case that T.L.O.’s framework has rendered inapplicable.106 In 
T.L.O., the Court focused its “justified at inception” analysis on 
whether the official had reasonable grounds for suspecting a search 
would produce evidence the student was violating a school policy.107 
The proper question in this analysis is whether any search was 
justified, leaving the type of search conducted for the later inquiry 
into the scope of the search.108 Despite challenging much of the 
evidence Assistance Principal Wilson relied upon, the majority 
conceded that some search of Redding was likely justified in light of 
the available information,109 which is sufficient to satisfy the first 
prong of the reasonableness analysis.110 
The second prong of T.L.O.’s framework, whether the search was 
permissible in scope, is at “the heart of this case.”111 This prong 
requires careful consideration of whether, based on all of the 
circumstances, the search was excessively intrusive.112 The majority 
significantly devalued the school’s interest in deterring drug use by 
students, expressing a sentiment that is contrary to clear dictates from 
the Supreme Court.113 The Ninth Circuit questioned whether the 
prescription pills posed a significant threat, but the school policy 
 
 104. See id. at 1095 n.3 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (explaining that the intrusiveness of the 
search should be considered in assessing the scope of a search). 
 105. Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 596 (2d Cir. 2006); Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consol. 
High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 106. See Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 596–97 n.4 (citing M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (1979)) 
(holding that probable cause is required to justify highly intrusive searches even in a school 
setting). 
 107. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985). 
 108. See Redding, 531 F.3d at 1095 n.3 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (describing why the two 
prongs should be meaningfully distinct). 
 109. Id. at 1081 (majority opinion) (“reasonable suspicion may very well have justified the 
initial search of Redding’s backpack and the emptying of her pockets”). 
 110. Id. at 1097 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. at 1103. 
 112. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (considering the age and sex of the student, as well as the 
nature of the infraction). 
 113. E.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002); 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995). 
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prohibits possession of prescription pills, and school officials’ policy 
determinations are entitled to deference.114  
Although hindsight might suggest the search in this case was 
overly intrusive, the school officials faced a potentially dangerous 
attention that necessitated prompt and decisive resolution. Assistant 
Principal Wilson knew students had planned to distribute and take 
prescription pills at lunch.115 Marissa, a student with firsthand 
knowledge, claimed that Redding had given her ibuprofen as well as 
an unidentified blue pill.116 Administrators were unsure whether 
Redding had pills in her possession or if she was distributing them.117 
However, confronted with a dangerous scenario similar to one that 
nearly killed a student the previous year, Assistant Principal Wilson 
felt immediate action was necessary.118 Under such circumstances, 
administrators need flexibility to respond quickly to address 
situations that threaten student health or safety.119 
The majority concluded that Assistant Principal Wilson had no 
specific evidence giving him a reason to suspect that a strip search 
would reveal evidence of the prescription pills.120 In a similar case, 
however, the Sixth Circuit found there were reasonable grounds for a 
strip search despite uncertainty about whether it would reveal 
evidence.121 The small size of the item sought (a vial of white powder) 
supported the administrator’s suspicion even though no specific 
information suggested where the drugs might be found.122 The 
majority’s analysis ignored similar facts surrounding the search of 
Redding, and therefore bears a striking resemblance to the “crabbed 
 
 114. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.9. 
 115. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1076. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 7, at 8–9. 
 118. Id. at 4–5. 
 119. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352–53 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (discussing purpose of T.L.O. 
standard); see also Redding, 531 F.3d at 1103–06 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (listing factors that 
should inform the “scope” inquiry, including the probability of success, the intrusiveness of the 
search, the nature of the infraction, the ongoing nature of the threat, and whether the behavior 
threatens students’ health and safety). 
 120. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1083. 
 121. See Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that even though the school found no evidence of drugs after searching the student’s 
possessions, a strip search was justified because it was reasonable to suspect the student was 
carrying the drugs on his person). 
 122. Id. 
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notion of reasonableness” that the Supreme Court rejected in 
T.L.O.123 
The scope of the search in this case certainly presents a more 
difficult question, but even if the search did violate Redding’s 
constitutional rights, those rights were not “clearly established.” The 
Ninth Circuit found that T.L.O.’s legal framework gave Assistant 
Principal Wilson fair warning that the search in this case was 
unreasonable.124 But cases in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, also 
applying T.L.O.’s reasonableness test, have held strip searches by 
school officials constitutional on similar facts.125 Even in cases in which 
courts found egregious violations of the plaintiff’s rights, school 
officials received qualified immunity.126 Several circuits have explained 
that T.L.O. simply does not give enough guidance to school officials 
for the law to be clear.127 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that 
when judges disagree about the constitutionality of conduct, 
government officials should not be subject to civil liability for picking 
the losing side of the controversy.128 Despite judicial disagreement 
over the reasonableness of strip searches, the Ninth Circuit imposed 
civil liability on Assistant Principal Wilson, a result clearly contrary to 
the Supreme Court’s intentions. 
VI.  ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION 
Redding has a strong argument that the scope of the officials’ 
search was unreasonable and violated her constitutional rights.129 Strip 
searching a student to find prescription ibuprofen might be 
unreasonable, even in light of the strong interest schools have in 
 
 123. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343. 
 124. Redding , 531 F.3d at 1088. 
 125. Williams, 966 F.2d at 887; Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 
991 F.2d 1316, 1323 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 126. See Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 
1997) (holding that officials were entitled to qualified immunity when, on two occasions, they 
strip searched two eight-year-old students to find seven dollars); Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. 
Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 607–08 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that officials were entitled to qualified 
immunity for mass strip search of over twenty students without individualized suspicion in order 
to locate missing money). 
 127. Beard, 402 F.3d at 607; Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 954 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
 128. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999). 
 129. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14–15, Safford 
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, No. 08–479 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Respondent’s 
Brief]. 
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deterring drug use, 130 but to prevail Redding also must prove that New 
Jersey v. T.L.O. establishes a clear framework that put the officials on 
notice that the search was unreasonable in her case.131 Redding will 
argue that courts reviewing school searches have come to different 
conclusions because the balancing test is fact-sensitive, not because 
the law is unclear.132 Yet, Redding’s qualified immunity argument is 
weak and it will be difficult to prevail on that issue.133 
Safford’s strongest argument is that Assistant Principal Wilson is 
entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not “clearly 
established” at the time of the search.134 The Ninth Circuit’s 
conclusion that Redding’s constitutional rights were “clearly 
established” does not seem true when multiple judges have concluded 
the search of Redding was reasonable.135 In addition to the 
disagreement in this case, other courts have found similar searches to 
be constitutional or found the officers entitled to qualified 
immunity.136 It will be difficult, however, for Safford to prove that the 
scope of the search was justified.137 Safford officials conducted an 
extremely intrusive search without any specific evidence regarding 
the location where Redding was allegedly hiding pills.138 
Although the Supreme Court could simply conclude that the law 
was not clearly established and avoid the constitutional question, it is 
likely the Court will fully address the merits of this case. The Ninth 
Circuit, following the Second and Seventh Circuits, adopted a sliding 
scale approach that unnecessarily complicates T.L.O.’s two-prong 
inquiry.139 This case presents the Court with an opportunity to provide 
 
 130. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 21, Safford 
Unified Sch, Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, No. 08–479 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2009) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus 
Brief] (arguing that the reasonableness standard would only permit a highly intrusive search if 
Assistant Principal Wilson had a reasonable suspicion that the drugs were hidden in a place that 
a strip search would reveal them). 
 131. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 129, at 18. 
 132. Id. at 10. 
 133. See U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 130, at 29–33 (concluding Assistant Principal Wilson 
was entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established). 
 134. See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 7, at 49–52 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s qualified 
immunity analysis ignored a vast body of relevant case law). 
 135. Id. at 52. 
 136. Id. at 50–52. 
 137. See U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 130, at 21 (recognizing that the search was not 
justified in scope). 
 138. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 139. Id. at 1095–97 (Hawkins, J., dissenting). 
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further guidance for assessing the reasonableness of school searches. 
The Court should conclude that a search of Redding was justified at 
inception, and may even conclude that despite the significant 
intrusion, the scope of the search was permissible due to the special 
needs of the school environment. Due to the current lack of guidance 
for lower courts especially when determining whether a search is 
excessively intrusive, the Supreme Court may articulate factors for 
lower courts to consider.140 Even if the Court finds the search of 
Redding was unconstitutional, Assistant Principal Wilson is entitled to 
qualified immunity because the unconstitutionality of the search was 
not clearly established. 
 
 
 140. See id. at 1103–06 (suggesting factors that would help define the contours of the scope 
analysis). 
